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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MINH NGOC HA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970746-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) (1998) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital 
felony. Appellant Minh Ngoc Ha ("Ha") was convicted of 
aggravated assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (a) (Supp. 1996), and assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 
1996). The judgments are attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to comply with 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration when it allowed an 
unqualified interpreter to translate trial testimony. 
Standard of Review: The issue presented is a matter of 
"statutory construction which is reviewed for correctness." Price 
v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991)). Also, this Court may 
review matters under the plain error standard that affect a 
party's substantial rights. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 
(Utah 1992) . 
2. Whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 
in closing argument. 
Standard of Review: In assessing the prosecutor's 
statements, this Court will make a determination of whether the 
prosecutor brought improper information to the jurors' attention, 
and whether such information probably influenced the jurors. 
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). If this Court 
views the evidence of guilt to be ambiguous or in conflict with 
other evidence, this Court will "more closely scrutinize the 
conduct." Id. When objections are not made at trial, appellate 
review is under a "plain error" standard. State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
3. Whether trial counsel rendered constitutionally 
deficient assistance in failing to object to prosecutorial 
misconduct, and failing to seek a curative instruction. 
Standard of Review: "When, as in this case, the claim of 
ineffective assistance is raised for the first time on appeal, we 
resolve the issue as a matter of law." State v. Gallecros. 355 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Strain, 
885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994)). 
4. Whether the cumulative effect of the errors and 
irregularities in the case prevented Ha from presenting his 
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defense and denied him a fair trial. 
Standard of Review: Reversal is appropriate if the cumu-
lative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that a 
fair trial was had. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 
1993). In assessing cumulative error, this Court considers all 
the identified errors as well as errors this Court assumes may 
have occurred. Id. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
With respect to the first and second issues on appeal, they 
were not preserved in the record but may be reviewed under the 
plain error doctrine. State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993); State v. Labrum, 
925 P.2d 937, 940-41 (Utah 1996). The third issue, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, may be reviewed for the first time on 
direct appeal by this Court. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 
(Utah 1998). The fourth issue concerning cumulative error is 
reviewed on direct appeal where the record is adequate. See e.g. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rule and constitutional provisions will be 
determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306 (1998). 
Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum B. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
In January 1997, Ha was charged by Information with one 
count of aggravated assault, a second degree felony in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1996), and one count of 
assault, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-102 (Supp. 1996) , in connection with an incident that 
allegedly occurred in May 1996. (R. 34-36.) During the trial of 
this matter, Ha was represented by private counsel. (R. 13.) 
The jury found Ha guilty of each charged offense and the 
trial judge sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. (R. 128-29; 
131-32.) Ha is incarcerated. Thereafter, private counsel 
withdrew from the case, and the trial court appointed Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association to represent Ha for purposes of the 
appeal. (R. 142; 162.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 19, 1996, Tai Luu was stabbed in the back at a dance 
club parking lot. (R. 193:45-52.) Hanna Kim was struck in the 
face with the butt of a knife during the same encounter. (R. 
193:92.) Ha was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and 
assault allegedly for inflicting the injuries on Luu and Kim. (R. 
34-36.) 
The case went to trial. Because Appellant Ha and defense 
witness Tran Nguyen spoke only Vietnamese, they requested the 
assistance of an interpreter. (R. 193:4, 134, 162-63.) During 
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its case-in-chief the state presented three witnesses, who 
testified to the events. The witnesses' testimony surrounding 
the circumstances varied. Luu admitted that during the assault, 
it was dark in the parking lot, and he testified that during a 
police photo array, he identified Ha and one other person as the 
possible assailant. (R. 193:63, 77; Exhibit 6.) Witness Vu Tran 
testified that he did not observe Ha in possession of a knife and 
he did not witness the assaults. (R. 193:121.) 
During opening statement, Ha's counsel made specific 
representations with respect to the evidence that he anticipated 
the defense would present. Counsel asserted that the evidence 
would show that Ha was at the dance club on May 19, 1996, but he 
left the club before the assaults. (R. 193:133.) Counsel then 
called Ha to testify first in the defendant's case. (R. 193:134.) 
The testimony at times was confusing, unresponsive or unclear.1 
^or example, defense counsel asked Ha if he remembered May 
19, 1996. Ha's answer was confusing: "I don't remember what 
night, but I remember come there a couple times." (R. 193:136.) 
In addition, during direct examination, Ha testified that he 
resided in Salt Lake until June 1996 when he left for Texas, as 
he did each year, to work. (R. 193:139-40.) Ha also testified 
that he worked in Utah during the months of March and April 1996. 
Thereafter, the prosecutor responded on cross-examination that 
"from the middle of March to the end of April, you did not have a 
job." (R. 193:145-46.) Ha corrected the prosecutor. The 
prosecutor then questioned Ha about his employment again. Ha 
explained that every year between March and May he went to Texas 
to work. (R. 193:147.) While Ha had already testified on direct 
examination that he postponed going to Texas until approximately 
June 1996 (R. 193:139-40 (Ha stayed in Texas for a month after 
May)), the prosecutor's examination created confusion with 
respect to the matter. Specifically, after Ha stated that he went 
to Texas every year between March and May, the prosecutor stated 
"May of 1996" then asked the interpreter, "he went to Texas to 
work?" (R. 193:147.) Ha answered yes. It is not clear from the 
(continued...) 
5 
After Ha testified, a second interpreter, who was not 
certified or qualified to translate the Vietnamese language in 
this jurisdiction, was sworn to translate Nguyen's testimony. (R. 
193:162-63.) The record reflects the following with respect to 
the second interpreter: 
MR. BARBER (Counsel for Ha): We would call Tran Nguyen. 
And, your Honor, she does not speak English. I do have an 
interpreter present [] to translate her testimony. 
THE COURT: Very well. Let's have your interpreter come 
forward and take the oath. 
Has this person been certified? To your knowledge, Mr. 
Barber, has the interpreter been certified? 
MR. BARBER: Have you been certified? 
MR. HUYNH (Interpreter): Actually, we don't have such 
vocation in Utah, but I do perform vocation in front of the 
Industrial Commission. 
THE COURT: I mean through the administrative office of the 
courts. But apparently not. 
Your name, sir? 
MR.HUYNH: Tarn, T-A-M and the last name is spelled H-U-Y-N-H. 
THE COURT: Will you, sir, please raise your right hand and 
take the oath of interpreter? 
(R. 193:162-63.) Thereafter, counsel for the defense made a 
statement to the jury with respect to the interpreter: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to advise you 
in advance of questioning Ms. Nguyen, that [Tarn], who's the 
(...continued) 
examination whether Ha was responding that he went to Texas to 
work, or that he went to Texas in May of 1996 to work. The 
prosecutor took advantage of the confusion in closing argument: 
"Minh Ha himself said he was in Texas the month of May 1996. His 
sister Tran said, "Oh, yeah, oh, but he was in Salt Lake County 
May of 1996.' They couldn't even get their stories straight about 
when he was here. He claims he wasn't here at all, he was in 
Texas working." (R. 193:197.) That incorrect statement in closing 
was used to discredit Ha. 
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interpreter, is a friend of Ms. Nguyen's family. That 
includes the defendant, Mr. Minh Ha. He has been present 
during the trial. He was present during the preliminary 
hearing that we had in this case and has been present 
throughout the various court proceedings that have brought 
us to trial today. 
(R. 193:164.) 
Nothing in the record suggests that Ha waived the right to 
have an interpreter pursuant to Rule 3-306 translate the 
testimony or that the trial judge otherwise complied with the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration when he appointed a non-
qualified, non-certified interpreter to translate the testimony. 
(See R. 193, generally.) As Nguyen testified during the 
proceedings, the trial judge twice made reference to language 
barriers and communication problems. (R. 193:166, 168.) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the case 
came down to identity: "The question really that you have to ask 
yourself and the major issue in the case is did Mr. Minh Ha stab 
Tai Luu and hit Hanna Kim or are they just simply mistaken about 
who it is that did this? Because that's what this comes down to. 
It's an issue of[,] was he the one that did it." (R. 193:181.) 
The prosecutor emphasized that the case hinged on the state's 
witnesses identifying a tattoo in the middle of the perpetrator's 
forehead. According to the prosecutor "When you consider the 
uniqueness of the tattoo, it comes down to a very small, small 
number. In fact, it might just be one, and that one would be Ha 
Minh --or Minh Ha, I'm sorry." (R. 193:183.) 
During rebuttal, the prosecutor stated again, "So I go back 
to the question, how many people are going to have a tattoo in 
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the middle of their forehead in this society? There isn't going 
to be anyone but the defendant. That's how he's identified, and 
there might be a mistake about his height, his weight, his hair 
style, but it's unmistakable about the tattoo in the middle of 
his forehead." (R. 193:199.) 
The jury was provided with a cautionary instruction that 
eyewitness identification testimony may be unreliable for various 
reasons. (R. 90-92.) The instruction recognized that identifica-
tions made from a photograph are less reliable. In this case, two 
witnesses testified that they identified Ha from a photo array. 
They also described the perpetrator as a man with a tattoo on his 
forehead. Ha was the only individual in the photo array with a 
tattoo on his forehead. (See R. 193:63, 97; Exhibits 5 and 6.) 
The jury found Ha guilty of assault and aggravated assault, 
and the trial judge sentenced him to prison. Ha is incarcerated. 
(R. 193:205-06.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, provides 
for the service of interpreters in this jurisdiction. It sets 
forth certification procedures for interpreters in foreign 
languages. The rule also recognizes that where no certification 
program is established for a specific language, a "qualified" 
interpreter may be appointed to translate in a case. Further, a 
non-certified, non-qualified interpreter may be used to translate 
testimony only after the trial court has made certain 
determinations with respect to the proceedings. In this case, a 
8 
non-qualified, non-certified interpreter was appointed to 
translate testimony. In connection with the appointment, the 
trial court failed to make the determinations set forth in Rule 
3-3 06. The trial court erred as a matter of law. Although the 
issue concerning the translator's qualifications was not raised 
below, the issue may be reviewed under the plain error standard. 
The prosecutor represented during closing argument that 
statistics support that Ha is the only person with a tattoo of a 
question mark on his forehead. No evidence was presented in 
support of that claim. The prosecutor's statements went beyond 
the evidence and were improper under the plain error doctrine, 
where case law and the professional rules of conduct prohibit 
attorneys from alluding to matters not introduced in evidence at 
trial. In addition, the improper comments had a prejudicial 
effect. The prosecutor knew the case hinged on identification 
and made unsupported statistical representations to support the 
state's case. 
In addition, trial counsel for Ha failed to object to the 
improper remarks. Trial counsel's performance was deficient and 
prejudicial to the outcome of the trial. Ha was denied effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the state and federal 
constitutions. He is entitled to a new trial on that basis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH 
RULE 3-306 IN APPOINTING A NON-QUALIFIED, NON-CERTIFIED 
INTERPRETER TO TRANSLATE TESTIMONY, 
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The plain-error doctrine considers whether the trial court 
failed to comply with the plain requirements of the law. 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to 
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not 
properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: 
(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.11 
See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Fontana, 680 
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984); see also rstate v. Eldredae, 
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989)]; CJU Utah R.Evid. 103(d); 
Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c). If any one of these requirements is 
not met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamil-
ton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); Verde, 770 P.2d at 123. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). In this case, 
the court committed plain error in appointing Huynh to translate 
testimony. The court failed to comply with the clear language of 
Rule 3-306, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
The current Rule 3-3 06 was enacted in 1996 to "secure the 
rights of persons who are unable, because of a non-English 
speaking cultural background, to understand or communicate 
adequately in the English language when they are involved in 
legal proceedings." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306 (1998). 
To that end, the rule mandates the appointment of a 
"certified" interpreter when an interpreter is "requested or when 
the appointing authority determines that a principal party in 
interest or witness has a limited ability to understand and 
communicate in English." Id. at 3-306(6)(A). Certification 
contemplates training, testing, continuing education, and re-
certifying interpreters in accordance with a program established 
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by the court administrative office. Id. at 3-306(4). 
If a certified interpreter is not available to translate, 
the trial court may appoint a non-certified interpreter "under 
those circumstances specified in subsection (6)(B) or (C)" of the 
rule. Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6) (A). Subsection (6) (B) 
allows for the appointment of a "qualified" interpreter if no 
certification program has been established for interpreters in a 
specific language. Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6)(B). 
"Qualification" contemplates that the appointing authority 
ask questions of the interpreter concerning specific matters that 
reflect the interpreters ability to translate. Id. The rule 
provides that the procedure to qualify an interpreter "need not 
recur every time the interpreter is used," and the names of 
qualified interpreters shall be placed on a list for use in 
district court cases where a certified interpreter is not 
reasonably available. Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306 (6) (B) (iii) . 
According to the rule, both qualified and certified 
interpreters are held to a "minimum performance standard." The 
standard mandates that all "certified and qualified interpreters 
serving in the court shall comply with the Code of Professional 
Responsibility" (hereinafter the "Code"). Utah Code Jud. Admin. 
3-306(3). A copy of the Code is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
The Code holds interpreters to specific ethical standards. 
Pursuant to 3-306(6) (C) , a non-qualified, non-certified 
interpreter may be appointed to translate in court proceedings 
under the following conditions: 
11 
[W]hen a certified or qualified interpreter is not 
reasonably available, or the court determines that the 
gravity of the case and potential penalty to the accused 
person involved are so minor that delays attendant to 
obtaining a certified or qualified interpreter are not 
justified. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(6) (C). The non-qualified, non-
certified interpreter is not held to the "minimum performance 
standard" or to compliance with the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(3). Thus, the 
rule contemplates use of such an interpreter in limited 
circumstances. 
Finally, Rule 3-306 provides that a person may waive the 
right to the services of an interpreter as set forth in the rule 
"only when" the following occurs: 
[(7)(A)](i) the waiver is approved by the appointing 
authority after explaining on the record to the non-English 
speaking person through an interpreter the nature and effect 
of the waiver; 
(ii) the appointing authority determines on the record that 
the waiver has been made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily; and 
(iii) the non-English speaking person has been afforded the 
opportunity to consult with his or her attorney. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-3 06. 
The waiver provisions of Rule 3-306 are consistent with 
earlier Utah case law, where the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
that certain rights require personal waiver by the defendant, 
including the right to trial, the right to trial by jury, the 
right to be present at trial, and the right to an interpreter at 
trial. See State v. Butterfield. 784 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1989) 
(citing People v. Mata Aguilar, 677 P.2d 1198, 1204, 200 
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Cal.Rptr. 908, 914-15 (1984)). 
A unifying characteristic of these rights appears to be that 
they are of central importance to the quality of the guilt-
determining process and the defendant's ability to 
participate in that process. 
Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 3-3 06 IN 
APPOINTING AN INTERPRETER CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND PLAIN ERROR. 
Under an earlier version of Rule 3-306, this Court 
determined that a trial court's appointment of an interpreter is 
subject to reversal only for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Fung, 907 P. 2d 1192, 1194 (Utah App. 1995); see also State v. 
Truiillo, 214 P.2d 626, 634-35 (Utah 1950) (before lower court is 
overruled in use of interpreter, there should be evidence of 
abuse of discretion). Also, "the burden rests with the defendant 
to show that he was somehow denied a fair trial by the 
interpreter's deficiencies." Fung, 907 P.2d at 1194 (citing 
State v. Mendoza, 891 P.2d 939, 942 (Ariz. App. 1995)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized in numerous cases that 
failure to comply with Utah law constitutes an abuse of 
discretion as well as plain error. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 
937 (Utah 1996) (trial court's failure to comply with statutory 
law constituted plain error); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 
1135-36 (Utah 1989) (lower court overruled for abuse of 
discretion where judge failed to consider statutory factors); 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) (record failed to 
reflect that trial judge considered facts in light of statutory 
law: "if this issue recurs on remand, we instruct the trial judge 
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to consider [the statutory factor] and to make findings"); State 
v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991) (record reflected that 
trial judge fully complied with statutory requirements; thus, no 
abuse of discretion); State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 
1990) (record reflected that trial court properly considered 
legal factors; thus, no abuse of discretion); State v. McCovey, 
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) ("An abuse of discretion results 
when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant 
factors1"); State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah 1989) 
(judge's discretion lies within limits prescribed by law); State 
v. Kelly, 784 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1989) (discretion is within 
statutory limits); State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 
1986) (discretion is limited by law); State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 
1210, 1219-20 (Utah 1984) (statutory law prescribes the bounds of 
the trial court's discretion); see also State v. Begishe, 937 
P.2d. 527, 532 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court exceeded its 
discretion in denying continuance for prosecutor's failure to 
comply with discovery statute and rule). 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in 
appointing Tarn Huynh to serve as an interpreter. Huynh was not 
qualified under Rule 3-306(6) (B) or certified under Rule 3-
306(6) (A) to translate testimony (see R. 193:162-63), and the 
trial court failed to make the specific inquiry for the 
appointment of a non-certified, non-qualified interpreter as set 
forth at Rule 3-306(6) (C) . (See R. 193 generally.) That is, the 
court failed to determine that a "certified or qualified 
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interpreter [was] not reasonably available" or that "the gravity 
of the case and potential penalty to the accused person involved 
[were] so minor that delays attendant to obtaining a certified or 
qualified interpreter [were] not justified." Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. 3-306(6) (C) . Because Huynh was not qualified or certified, 
he was not held to the minimum performance standards or the Code 
of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters. See Utah Code 
Jud. Admin. 3-3 06(3) and (8); Addendum C, hereto. 
Since the court failed to appoint Huynh in accordance with 
Rule 3-306(6), the appointment was the equivalent of failing to 
designate an interpreter under the rule. The court in that 
instance was required to take a waiver from Ha before allowing 
the matter to proceed. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-306(7) (1998). 
Subsection (7) requires the trial court to obtain a specific 
waiver on the record. See also Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 156. 
Here, the court failed to comply with those provisions; it failed 
to "approve" waiver "after explaining on the record to the non-
English speaking person" the nature and effect of waiver; and it 
failed to determine "on the record" that such a waiver was made 
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. 3-306(7). 
In Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that failure to comply with the 
plain language of a rule set forth in the code of judicial 
administration constituted a "clear violation" of the law. Since 
nothing in the record here reflects compliance with Rule 3-306 in 
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the appointment of Huynh as interpreter, the appointment 
constituted a clear abuse of discretion and violation of the law. 
Ha has satisfied the first prong of the plain-error analysis. 
B. THE ERROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
Prior to appointing Huynh to serve as interpreter, the trial 
court asked whether Huynh was certified to serve in such a capa-
city under Utah law. (R. 193:162-63.) Huynh replied that he was 
not. (Id.) Thereafter, the judge failed to make the inquiry 
that he was required to make under Utah law. Once Huynh disclosed 
his lack of qualification/certification to serve as interpreter 
in this jurisdiction, Rule 3-306(6)(C) contemplated appointment 
only under limited circumstances. The judge's failure to comply 
with the plain language of the Rule constituted obvious error, 
satisfying the second prong of the plain-error analysis. 
C. UNDER THE PREJUDICE PRONG, HA MUST SHOW THAT HE WAS 
DENIED A FAIR TRIAL. 
Next, Ha must show "that he was somehow denied a fair trial 
by the interpreter's deficiencies." Fung, 907 P.2d at 1194 
(citing State v. Mendoza, 891 P.2d 939, 942 (Ariz. App. 1995)); 
see also State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991) (defendant failed to show 
prejudice). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional 
significance of the use of an interpreter. Failure to properly 
provide an interpreter may in certain circumstances deny defen-
dant the right to be present during proceedings, the right to 
assist counsel in his defense, and the right to present witnesses 
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in his defense. See State v. Vasquez, 121 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 
1942); State v. Masato Karumai, 126 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Utah 1942). 
Specifically, if a defendant does not speak English and the 
court refuses to provide a proper interpreter, "from some points 
of view it is analogous to [the defendant] being out of hearing." 
Vasquez, 121 P.2d at 905. 
[I]n a criminal prosecution the accused has the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel and to be 
confronted by the witness against him. "He had the right to 
see and be seen, hear and be heard, under such reasonable 
regulations as the law established[,] by our constitution." 
Id. Failure to provide defendant with a proper interpreter may 
interfere with those rights and deny defendant a fair trial. Id. 
"The constitutional right to be confronted by witnesses 
against him, and to defend in person, would be of little 
avail to the accused if he could be compelled to remain away 
during his trial, out of the sight and hearing of the 
witnesses against him." We have authority for the position 
that the defendant has the right to see the witness 
testifying against him and to hear what the witness says. 
Are these rights more essential, or even as essential, than 
the right to understand what is going on in the proceeding? 
Suppose a defendant were placed in a transparent compartment 
where he could see all that took place, yet was deprived of 
hearing what was said because all sound was cut off, could 
it be said that such a situation were less than a 
deprivation of the constitutional right of confrontation? 
The purpose of the confrontation must be to permit the 
defendant to be advised of the proceedings against him. 
Degrees of understanding may present themselves between 
that of complete comprehension of the language to that of 
minor matters. The question, not properly heard or 
understood, may bring forth an answer that might turn the 
scales from innocence to guilt or from guilt to innocence. 
Then, too, the answer given might be made in words not 
entirely familiar or understood by the defendant. Mr. 
Justice Holmes once wrote: "A word is not a crystal, 
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according 
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." 
Town v. Eisner, 1918, 245 U.S. 418, at page 425, 38 S.Ct. 
158, at page 159, 62 L.Ed. 372, L.R.A. 1918D, 254. 
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Id. Also, in Masato Karumai the court stated: 
In this type of case [where defendant is entitled to have 
the proceedings translated] there is a serious possibility 
of grave injustice being done an accused by reason of his 
being unable to properly present his defense due to his 
inability to speak or understand the language in which the 
trial is conducted. Thus it is the duty of the Court to 
take whatever steps are necessary to prevent injustice .... 
Masato Karumai, 126 P.2d at 1050; see also State v. Doporto, 935 
P.2d 484, 494-95 (Utah 1997) ("failure to provide adequate 
hearing assistance would be equivalent to trying Doporto in 
absentia. The unfortunate part of hearing loss is that a hearing-
impaired person may not know what he does not hear"). 
Thus, failure to provide a proper interpreter may violate 
defendant's right to be present at trial under Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal constitution; defendant's right to 
confront witnesses under those same provisions (see Vasquez, 121 
P.2d at 905 (accused cannot confront witness whose language he 
cannot understand)); and defendant's opportunity to present his 
defense, also under those same provisions. Where an improper 
interpreter is used, testimony translated to the jury and 
counsel, and questions translated to the witness may be 
inaccurate. "The question, not properly heard or understood, may 
bring forth an answer that might turn the scales from innocence 
to guilt or from guilt to innocence." Vasquez, 121 P.2d at 905. 
Inasmuch as failure to provide a proper interpreter violates 
a defendant's constitutional rights, the "fair trial" analysis 
should contemplate application of the constitutional harmless-
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error standard. Under that standard, for an error to be held 
harmless, this court must "sincerely believe that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862,867 
(Utah App. 1997) (emphasis in original). 
Since the person appointed to translate Nguyen's testimony 
was not a proper interpreter, and the judge failed to employ any 
safeguards to ensure accurate translation, see Fung, 907 P.2d at 
1194 (trial court found that interpreter had adequate 
understanding of court system and terms used in proceedings to 
provide translation; also, court instructed interpreter to alert 
court to any difficulties in translating), there is no way to 
know the degree to which Nguyen's testimony was inaccurately 
translated, or what questions/responses would have followed if 
the testimony had been correctly translated. The legal error 
prevented Ha from presenting Nguyen as a witness. Ha's right to 
call the witness in his defense was violated. Utah Const, art. 
I, § 12; U.S. Const. V, VI, XIV. 
Further, because the trial court failed to appoint an 
interpreter as provided under Rule 3-306, the presumptions and 
regularities set forth in that rule are not applicable. That is, 
Rule 3-306 requires the certified and qualified interpreter to 
comply with the minimum performance standards, including ethical 
rules applicable to interpreters. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-
306(4) and (8). If the court appoints an interpreter in "clear 
violation" of the rule, see Price, 949 P.2d at 1255, it cannot be 
fairly presumed that Huynh complied with the minimum performance 
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standards, the code of professional responsibility, or the oath 
provision set forth in Rule 3-306. See e.g. Salt Lake City v. 
Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1993) (where full compliance 
with law creates presumption of validity, failure to comply with 
law means that validity may not be presumed). 
In this case, if Nguyen had testified to the facts as 
identified by defense counsel in his opening statement, that is, 
that Ha had returned home from the dance club before the assaults 
(see R. 193:133), the jury would have been required to weigh 
Nguyen's testimony and credibility against that of (1) Luu (who 
testified that he identified another person as well as Ha as the 
perpetrator and that the parking lot was dark and he was being 
assaulted and running when he observed the perpetrator (R. 193: 
68-69, 77-78)), (2) Tran (who did not witness the assaults (R. 
193:121)), and (3) Kim (who identified Ha as the perpetrator). 
Kim testified that she saw the perpetrator in the dark 
parking lot during the early hours of the morning while she was 
crying. (R. 193:111, 88, 97.) At the same time that she was 
observing the perpetrator, Kim was protecting Luu from further 
assault, and she was being assaulted across the face. (R. 193:92, 
102-03.) In this case, the jury was cautioned to seriously 
consider those factors that may affect Kim and Luu's ability to 
provide reliable eye-witness identification. (R. 90-92.) 
The instruction directed jurors to consider matters 
affecting Kim's and Luu's observations, such as the light 
available to the observer, and the emotional and physical strains 
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on the observer, including fatigue, drug or alcohol use, and 
whether the observer was experiencing stress. (See R. 90-92); 
see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-489 (Utah 1986). Thus, 
reliability concerns surrounded the testimony presented through 
the state's witnesses in this case. 
Since it is difficult to know the degree to which Nguyen's 
testimony was inaccurately translated, or what questions/ 
responses would have followed if the testimony had been correctly 
translated, it is likewise difficult to know whether Nguyen's 
testimony accurately translated through a proper interpreter 
would have tipped the balance in favor of finding a more 
favorable result for Ha. The possibility exists that the jury 
would have believed Nguyen over Kim if Nguyen's testimony had 
been translated accurately by a proper interpreter. 
To be harmless under a constitutional analysis, evidence 
must be so powerful and cumulative that the error would not have 
swayed the jury's judgment. State v. Dahlquist. 931 P.2d 862, 867 
(Utah App. 1997). Since the evidence in this case was not so 
powerful or cumulative, the legal error here was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 
2 In the event this Court is inclined to apply the reasonable-
likelihood, harmless-error standard, under that standard, the 
reviewing court is to decide whether, considering all the 
evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury would 
have decided the case differently. State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 
1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). The analysis focuses on the taint caused 
by the error. Here the taint may have prevented the jury from 
considering Nguyen's testimony. A proper translation may have 
tipped the balance in favor of Ha, since Luu's eyewitness 
testimony was unsure, Tran did not witness the assaults, and the 
(continued...) 
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POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MAKING IMPROPER STATEMENTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test for 
reversals for improper statements of counsel: 
[The test is,] did the remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and were they, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973); accord State v. 
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah 
App. 1993) . 
In this case, during closing argument the prosecutor made 
remarks that called the attention of the jurors to circumstances 
that were not presented in evidence and that they were not 
justified in considering in connection with a verdict. 
Specifically, the prosecutor twice represented that 
statistically, Ha was the only person with a tattoo of a question 
mark on his forehead. (R. 193:183, 199.) During the prosecutor's 
initial closing argument he stated: 
When you consider the uniqueness of the tattoo, it comes 
down to a very small, small number. In fact, it might just 
be one, and that one would be Ha Minh --or Minh Ha, I'm 
sorry. 
(...continued) 
jury was cautioned to seriously consider factors affecting Kim's 
and Luu's ability to provide reliable eyewitness identification. 
Given the concerns surrounding the eyewitness testimony presented 
through state witnesses there was a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury would have decided the case differently. Ha has 
satisfied the reasonable-likelihood, harmless-error standard. 
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(R. 193:183.) The prosecutor also stated that if Ha were 
innocent, his attorney would explain Ha's tattoo. (R. 193:186.) 
Ha's counsel did not object to those incorrect and improper 
statements during the prosecutor's initial closing. Rather, the 
defense attorney responded to them, pointing out to the jury in 
closing argument that the statistical information was not based 
in facts of record, the jury was required to consider the 
evidence, and the defense did not have the burden of proving 
innocence as the prosecutor had represented. (R.193:188, 195-96.) 
Thereafter, the prosecutor made his surrebuttal comments, 
and with greater conviction represented that statistically 
speaking, Ha was the only person in society with a tattoo of a 
question mark on his forehead: "So I go back to the question, how 
many people are going to have a tattoo in the middle of their 
forehead in this society? There isn't going to be anyone but the 
defendant. That's how he's identified, and there might be a 
mistake about his height, his weight, his hair style, but it's 
unmistakable about the tattoo in the middle of his forehead." 
(R. 193:199.) Since the state failed to present statistical 
information to support the prosecutor's comments, the surrebuttal 
comments were improper. 
The prosecutor's assertions went beyond the actual evidence 
presented, and served to bolster the eyewitness identification 
testimony. Defense counsel did not object to the surrebuttal 
comments when they occurred. (R. 193:199.) Thus, Ha argues 
plain error on appeal. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has identified the test for estab-
lishing plain error as set forth in Point I, supra. Specifically, 
the appellant must show "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or 
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993) . 
Considering the first and second factors in Dunn, the error 
exists and should have been obvious to the trial court. Case law 
and the rules of professional conduct prohibit an attorney from 
alluding to matters not introduced as evidence at trial. State v. 
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993); Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct 3.4(e) (1997); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343. The Utah appellate 
courts have reiterated that it is error for a prosecutor to 
allude to the existence of prejudicial facts where the prosecutor 
has failed to prove those facts. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 
785-86 (Utah 1992); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343; Dunn 850 P.2d at 
1224-25. Ha has established legal error. 
With respect to whether the error was obvious, the trial 
court in this matter heard the prosecutor's assertions, and sat 
through the evidence at trial. The judge should have known the 
prosecutor's surrebuttal remarks were not supported by the 
evidence. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343. In addition, counsel for 
24 
the defense in closing argument pointed out that the earlier 
statements were insupportable. Thus, when the prosecutor made his 
surrebuttal comments with greater conviction, the trial court was 
alerted to the obvious problems. Since the state failed to 
present evidence to support the statistical information, there 
was no basis for the prosecutor's statement that Ha was the only-
person with a tattoo of a question mark on his forehead. The 
improper statements constituted obvious error. 
The third factor in Dunn is also established here. The 
prosecutor's improper statements were harmful. The prosecutor 
recognized that the pivotal issue in the case concerned 
eyewitness identification; and the prosecutor was aware of the 
reliability concerns surrounding such testimony as reflected in 
an instruction presented to the jury. (See R. 90-92.) In 
anticipation of those concerns, the prosecutor sought to bolster 
the testimony of his witnesses by making the strong, unfounded 
statistical assertion during his surrebuttal, closing comments. 
Since the improper comments went to the heart of the eyewitness 
identification testimony, they likely had an impact on the jury. 
"When the evidence in the record is circumstantial or 
sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced 
by an improper argument. In such instances, they are more 
susceptible to the suggestions that factors other than the 
evidence before them should determine a defendant's guilt or 
innocence." 718 P.2d at 403; accord Smith, 700 P.2d at 1112; 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224. In Dunn, the Utah Supreme Court 
considered legally improper comments made by the prosecutor 
during his initial closing statements. Id. at 1224-25. Defense 
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counsel in that case addressed the prosecutor's improper 
statements during his closing response, and the prosecutor made 
no further mention of the improper matters during his surrebuttal 
comments. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court in that case determined that "defense 
counsel's remark helped to ameliorate the harmful effect of the 
prosecutor's improper comment." Id. at 1225. This case is 
distinguishable in that defense counsel was unable to ameliorate 
the harmful effect of the improper, surrebuttal comments. After 
the prosecutor initially made the improper statements, defense 
counsel responded to them in his closing. (R. 193:195.) 
Thereafter, the prosecutor made the improper statements with 
greater conviction and authority. (R. 193:199.) To the extent 
defense counsel's response weakened the initial improper 
comments, the prosecutor came back stronger. 
Likewise, since the jurors were weighing evidence 
susceptible of differing interpretations and/or evidence 
presenting reliability concerns, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 
488-89 (Utah 1986) (eyewitness identification testimony should be 
considered with care given reliability concerns), there was a 
greater likelihood that the jurors would be improperly influenced 
by prosecutorial remarks going to the heart of that issue. In 
such a case, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing 
and interpreting the evidence. They may be especially 
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be 
sufficient to affect the verdict. Counsel is obligated in such 
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cases to avoid, as far as possible, any reference to those 
matters the jury is not justified in considering. Troy, 688 P.2d 
at 486-87. 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing 
conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they 
will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. 
Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for 
guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They 
may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small 
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. "The insinuation that other evidence 
exists encourages the jury to determine its verdict based upon 
evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a defendants right 
to a trial based upon the evidence presented." Young, 853 P.2d 
at 349 (finding plain error, but failing to find prejudice); see 
also State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997). 
As set forth herein, the prosecutor recognized the fragile 
nature of eyewitness identification testimony. The prosecutor 
recognized that the "major issue in the case is did Mr. Minh Ha 
stab Tai Luu and hit Hanna Kim, or are they just simply mistaken 
about who it is that did this?" (R. 193:181.) 
The prosecutor sought to supplement the evidence with the 
improper remarks. A prompt, curative instruction provided by the 
court at the time of the improper comments may have provided some 
relief from the comments. In this matter, the jury was advised in 
the jury charge that counsel!s statements do not constitute 
evidence. (R. 88.) However, the jury was not advised at the time 
of the improper comment that in reaching factual conclusions in 
the case, it was required to rely on evidence presented through 
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witnesses and exhibits, and that it should not consider the 
statements of counsel in reaching conclusions. See State v. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998) (court recognizes that 
prompt, effective curative instruction from trial judge may 
effectively neutralize damage); State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 
1129-30 (Me. 1982) (prompt and appropriate curative instruction 
in the face of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument may 
alleviate damage caused by conduct; general instruction 
concerning counsels' argument was insufficient); U.S. v. Solivan, 
937 F.2d 1146, 1157 (6th Cir. 1991) (in cases where an admonition 
has been found to mitigate or remove the taint of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the admonition has been swiftly given and firm). 
Here, the effect of the improper remarks was prejudicial. 
Since the improper remarks here were based on speculation 
and matters not in evidence, and the error was prejudicial such 
that in the absence of the error there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for Ha, the remarks compel 
the entry of an order reversing the judgment and remanding the 
case for a new trial. 
POINT III. HA'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE. 
The Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to 
assistance of counsel. The right to counsel has been construed 
to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); accord State v. 
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McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). The Court in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth the proper test for 
determining whether counsel!s performance was ineffective: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said 
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a 
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable. 
Id. at 687; accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185-86 & n.5 
(Utah 1990). Ha's counsel's performance was deficient in that he 
failed to object to the prosecutor's improper surrebuttal 
comments. 
As set forth in Point II, supra, it should have been obvious 
to defense counsel that the prosecutor's surrebuttal comments 
went beyond the evidence. (See R. 193:195.) There is no possible 
tactical reason, and none is apparent from the record, for 
defense counsel's failure to object to the surrebuttal remarks 
and to request a curative instruction. See State v. Bullock, 791 
P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) (tactical reason is apparent from the 
record). 
Ha was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to 
the comments. First, the comments improperly bolstered the 
eyewitness identification testimony. See Point II, supra. Where 
the state failed to present evidence to support the determination 
that Ha was the only person in society with a tattoo in the 
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middle of his forehead, the prosecutor supplemented the evidence 
with improper remarks. (R. 193:199.) 
Second, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an 
objection, at the very least it could have promptly and firmly 
advised the jury at the time of the comments that in reaching 
factual conclusions in the case, it was allowed to consider only 
the evidence presented through the witnesses and exhibits 
received in trial; counsel's comments may not be considered. See 
Reilly. 446 A.2d at 1129 (prompt and appropriate curative 
instruction may alleviate damage); Solivan. 937 F.2d at 1157 (in 
cases where an admonition has been found to mitigate or remove 
the taint of prosecutorial misconduct, the admonition has been 
swiftly given and firm). Utah courts repeatedly have ruled that 
the effects of improper statements in closing argument may be 
ameliorated by proper curative instructions. See Young, 853 P.2d 
at 349; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352-53 (curative instruction 
rendered improper statements harmless). 
In Pearson, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that although the 
prosecutor made improper comments in front of the jury, the 
comments were not likely to prejudice the outcome of the jury's 
deliberations where the trial court instructed the jurors that 
they were to rely only on the testimony of witnesses and the 
exhibits presented in evidence in reaching factual conclusions; 
they were not to rely on arguments of counsel. Pearson, 943 P.2d 
at 1353. Such an instruction would have been reasonable in this 
case. Instead, the court simply provided a form instruction that 
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states, "You should not consider as evidence any statement of 
counsel made during the trial." (R. 88.) Such an instruction 
likely had no bearing on the jury, and did not apparently have 
any relationship to the improper statistical data presented by 
the prosecutor. 
Third, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an 
objection to the prosecutor's remarks, Ha would have properly 
preserved the issue for review on the merits by this Court. 
Because trial counsel failed to object, Ha has been forced to 
argue plain error on appeal. See Point II, supra. This Court 
can and should address the merits of the issue concerning the 
improper remarks to alleviate this prejudice. Ha maintains that 
there was no conceivable tactical basis for failing to object to 
the prosecutor's improper surrebuttal closing statements. 
POINT IV. THE ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES IN THIS CASE COMPEL 
REVERSAL UNDER THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE. 
The trial court's failure to make proper inquiry before 
appointing a non-certified, non-qualified interpreter in this 
case, and the prosecutor's improper surrebuttal comments 
constitute legal error. In the event the errors alone may be 
harmless, the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 
1990); see also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. Here Ha was effectively 
denied the opportunity to present a witness through a qualified 
interpreter. In addition, the prosecutor, cognizant of the 
reliability concerns surrounding the eyewitness identification 
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testimony, improperly bolstered the testimony of the state 
witnesses with insupportable statistical information. The errors 
alone and together should undermine this Court's confidence that 
"a fair trial was had." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 295 
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 
(Utah App. 1997)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ha respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse this case and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this AJHJL day of Q * ^ O U R A ^ , 1999. 
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(ii) equipment and support staff sufficient to provide the transcript of the 
audio and video tapes in an accurate and timely manner. 
(iii) no conflict of interest in the matters transcribed. 
(C) Persons desiring to be certified as official court transcribers shall submit 
a written proposal to the administrative office of the courts setting forth their 
qualifications and ability to comply with the criteria set forth. 
(3) Preparation of transcript 
(A) An official court transcriber sHall prepare a transcript when assigned to 
do so by the court executive. 
(B) If an official court transcriber encounters a portion of the audio or video 
tape recording which is inaudible or incomplete, and which, in the opinion of 
the transcriber, is likely to significantly affect the accuracy and clarity of the 
transcript, the official court transcriber shall report t£at fact to the court 
executive and set forth the court, the date and time of the proceeding, and the 
perceived problem with the recording. 
(C) On each transcript, the official court transcriber shall take and sub-
scribe to an oath affirming that the audio or video tape recording has been 
transcribed accurately to the best of the transcriber's ability. 
(4) List of official court transcribers. The administrative office of the courts 
shall compile and distribute to the court executive a list of official court 
transcribers. When an additional transcriber is certified, an updated list shall 
be distributed. 
(5) Assignment of transcript preparation. The court executive shall assign 
the preparation of a court transcript to an official court transcriber in the 
following priority: 
(A) to an available official court reporter in the district, who has been 
certified as an official court transcriber; 
(B) to an available official court reporter in another district, who has been, 
certified as an official court transcriber; and 
(C) to an individual certified as an official court transcriber, who is not an 
official court reporter. 
(6) Complaints and sanctions. The administrative office of the courts may 
investigate any complaints made concerning the performance of an official 
court transcriber, and may, for good cause, rescind the certification of any 
official court transcriber. 
(Repealed and reenacted effective January 1, 1998.) 
Repeals and Reenactmenta, — Former ers, was repealed and the present rule enacted 
Rule 3-305, relating to certified court transcribe effective January 1, 1998. 
Rule 3-306. Court interpreters. 
Intent: 
To declare the policy of the Utah State Courts to secure the rights of persons 
who are unable, because of a non-English speaking cultural background, to 
understand or communicate adequately in the English language when they are 
involved in legal proceedings. 
Tb outline the procedure for certification, appointment, and payment of court 
interpreters. 
lb provide certified interpreters in all cases in those languages for which 
certification programs have been established. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to legal proceedings in the courts of record and not of 
record. 
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This rule shall apply to interpretation for non-English speaking persons and 
not to interpretation of the hearing impaired. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Definitions. 
(A) "Appointing authority" means a trial judge, administrative hearing 
officer or other officer authorized by law to conduct judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceedings, or a delegate thereof. 
(B) "Certified interpreter" means a person who has fulfilled the require-
ments set forth in subsection 4. 
(C) "Qualified interpreter" means an uncertified interpreter who has been 
found by the appointment authority to be qualified pursuant to subsection 
6(B). 
(D) "Code of Professional Responsibility" means the Code of Professional 
Responsibility for Court Interpreters set forth in Appendix H. 
(E) "Legal proceeding" means a civil, criminal, domestic relations, juvenile, 
traffic or administrative proceeding. Legal proceeding does not include a 
conference between the non-English speaking person and the interpreter that 
occurs outside the courtroom, hearing room, or chambers unless ordered by the 
appointing authority. In juvenile court legal proceeding includes the intake 
stage. 
(F) "Non-English speaking person" means any principal party in interest or 
witness participating in a legal proceeding who has limited ability to speak or 
understand the English language. 
(G) "Principal party in interest" means a person involved in a legal proceed-
ing who is a named party, or who will be bound by the decision or action, or who 
is foreclosed from pursuing his or her rights by the decision or action which 
may be taken in the proceeding. 
(H) "Witness" means anyone who testifies in any legal proceeding. 
(2) Advisory panel. Policies concerning court interpreters shall be developed 
by a court interpreter advisory panel, appointed by the council, comprised of 
judges, court administrators, lawyers, court interpreters, and experts in the 
field of linguistics. 
(3) Minimum performance standards. All certified and qualified interpret-
ers serving in the court shall comply with the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. 
(4) Certification. 
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, and in consultation with the 
advisory panel, the administrative office shall establish programs to certify 
court interpreters in the non-English languages most frequently needed in the 
courts. The administrative office shall: 
(i) designate languages for certification; 
(ii) establish procedures for training and testing to certify and recertify 
interpreters; and 
(iii) establish, maintain, and issue to all courts in the state a current 
directory of certified interpreters. 
(B) To become certified an interpreter shall: 
(i) prior to participation in the training program, pay a fee of $100.00 to the'-
administrative office to offset the costs of training and testing; 
(ii) complete training as required by the administrative office; 
(iii) obtain a passing score on the court interpreter's test(s) as required by 
the administrative office; and 
(iv) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility. A 
(C) An interpreter may be certified upon submission of satisfactory proof to 
the advisory panel that the interpreter is certified in good standing by thei 
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federal courts or by a state having a certification program that is equivalent to 
the program established under this section. 
(5) Recertification. 
(A) Subject to the availability of funding, the administrative office shall 
establish continuing educational requirements for maintenance of certified 
status. 
(B) To maintain certified status, a certified interpreter shall: 
(i) comply with continuing educational requirements as established by the 
administrative office; and 
(ii) comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
(6) Appointment 
(A) Certified interpreters. When an interpreter is requested or when the 
appointing authority determines that a principal party in interest or witness 
has a limited ability to understand and communicate in English, a certified 
interpreter shall be appointed except under those circumstances specified in 
subsection (6)(B) or (C). 
(B) Qualified interpreters. 
(i) Standards for appointment. A qualified interpreter may be appointed 
only under the following circumstances: 
(a) if there is no certification program established under subparagraph (4) 
for interpreters in the language for which an interpreter is needed, 
(b) if there is a certification program established under subsection (4), but 
no certified interpreter is reasonably available, or 
(c) for juvenile probation conferences, if the probation officer does not speak 
a language understood by juvenile. 
(ii) Procedure for appointment. Before appointing a qualified interpreter, 
the appointing authority or delegate shall: 
(a) evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the gravity of the 
judicial proceeding and the potential penalty or consequence to the accused 
person involved, 
(b) qualify the prospective interpreter by asking questions as to the follow-
ing matters in an effort to determine whether the interpreter has a minimum 
level of qualification: (1) whether the prospective interpreter appears to have 
adequate language skills, knowledge of interpreting techniques and familiar-
ity with interpreting in a court or administrative hearing setting; and 
(2) whether the prospective interpreter has read, understands, and agrees to 
comply with the code of professional responsibility for court interpreters set 
forth in appendix H. 
(iii) The procedure to qualify a non-certified interpreter need not recur every 
time the interpreter is used. Within each judicial district the names of 
non-certified interpreters who have been qualified by the appointing authority 
pursuant to subsection (6)(B) shall be placed on a list for use by the district in 
cases where a certified interpreter is not reasonably available. 
(iv) Court employees may serve as qualified interpreters, but their service 
shall be limited to short hearings that do not take them away from their 
regular duties for extended periods. 
(C) Non-qualified interpreter. Anon-certified, non-qualified interpreter may 
be appointed when a certified or qualified interpreter is not reasonably 
available, or the court determines that the gravity of the case and potential 
penalty to the accused person involved are so minor that delays attendant to 
obtaining a certified or qualified interpreter are not justified. 
(7) Waiver. 
(A) A non-English speaking person may at any point in the proceeding 
waive the right to the services of an interpreter, but only when: 
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(i) the waiver is approved by the appointing authority after explaining on 
the record to the non-English speaking person through an interpreter the 
nature and effect of the waiver; 
(ii) the appointing authority determines on the record that the waiver has 
been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and 
(iii) the non-English speaking person has been afforded the opportunity to 
consult with his or her attorney. 
(B) At any point in any proceeding, for good cause shown, a non-English 
speaking person may retract his or her waiver and request an interpreter. 
(8) Oath. All interpreters, before commencing their duties, shall take an 
oath that they will make a true and impartial interpretation using their best 
skills and judgment in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
(9) Removal in individual cases. Any of the following actions shall be good 
cause for a judge to remove an interpreter in an individual case: 
(A) being unable to interpret adequately, including where the interpreter 
self-reports such inability; 
(B) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an 
official capacity; 
(C) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information 
obtained while serving in an official capacity; 
(D) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility; and 
(E) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause. 
(10) Removal from certified or qualified list. Any of the following actions, 
shall be good cause for a court interpreter to be removed from the certified list 
maintained under subsection (4)(AXiii) or from the qualified list maintained 
under subsection (6)(B)(iii): 
(A) knowingly and willfully making false interpretation while serving in an 
official capacity; 
(B) knowingly and willfully disclosing confidential or privileged information 
obtained while serving in an official capacity; 
(C) failing to follow other standards prescribed by law and the Code of 
Professional Responsibility; and 
(D) failing to appear as scheduled without good cause. 
(11) Discipline. The advisory panel shall review and respond to allegations^ 
of violations of the Code of Professional Conduct, including decertification or? 
other disciplinary measures. Interpreters being disciplined will be given notice I 
of the disciplinary action and an opportunity to respond. 
(12) Payment. 
(A) Courts of record. 
(i) In courts of record, the administrative office shall pay interpreter fees: 
and expenses in 
(a) criminal cases in which the defendant is determined to be indigent, 
(b) juvenile court cases brought by the state, 
(c) cases filed against the state pursuant to U.R.C.P. 65B(b) or 65C, and 
(d) other cases in which the court determines that the state is obligated to 
pay for an interpreter's services. 
(ii) In all other civil cases and small claims cases, the party engaging the* 
services of the interpreter shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses. 
(iii) Fees. Certified court interpreters shall be paid $30 per hour. Qualified 
or non-qualified court interpreters shall be paid $25 per hour. Court employees 
acting as interpreters pursuant to (6XBXiv) shall be paid their regular hourly 
rate and shall not receive additional payment for interpreter services. 
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(iv) Expenses. Mileage for interpreters will be paid at the same rate as state 
employees for each mile necessarily traveled in excess of 50 miles round trip. 
Per diem expenses will be paid at the same rate as state employees. 
(v) Procedure for payment. The administrative office shall pay fees and 
expenses of the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed 
by the clerk of the court. The certification shall include the name, address and 
social security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of 
appearance, the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the 
amounts to be paid. 
(B) Courts not of record. 
(i) In courts not of record, the local government that funds the court not of 
record shall pay interpreter fees and expenses in criminal cases in which the 
defendant is determined to be indigent. 
(ii) In small claims cases, the party engaging the services of the interpreter. 
shall pay the interpreter fees and expenses. 
(iii) Fees. The local government that funds the court not of record shall 
establish the amount of the interpreter fees. 
(iv) Expenses. The local government that funds the court not of record shall 
establish interpreter expenses, if any, that will be paid. 
(v) Procedure for payment. The local government that funds the court shall 
pay the interpreter upon receipt of a certification of appearance signed by the 
clerk of the court. The certification shall include the name, address and social 
security number of the interpreter, the case number, the dates of appearance, 
the language interpreted, and an itemized statement of the amounts to be 
paid. 
(Repealed and reenacted effective November 1, 1996; amended effective 
December 13, 1996.) 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
ADDENDUM C 
APPENDIX H. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COURT ^T 
INTERPRETERS - ^ ; , 
Introduction. Canon ~ ^ f ^ T * * f T ^ . 
6. Restriction of public comment , 
7. Scope of practice. ^ ' f c s ** Canon 1. Accuracy and completeness.
 Q A , .. . ,. k . 
2. Representation of qualifications. 8« Assessing and reporting impediments to 
3. Impartiality and avoidance of conflict of in- ^ performance, 
terest. 9. Duty to report ethical violations. 
4^ Professional demeanor. 10. Professional development. 
5. Confidentiality. 
Introduction. 
This Code is based on the "Model Code of Professional Responsibility for 
Interpreters in the Judiciary developed by the National Center for State 
Courts with grant funding from the State Justice Institute, as set forth in the 
publication, Court Interpretation: Model Guides for Policy and Practice in the 
State Courts, Copyright 1995, National Center for State Courts. 
Many persons who come before the courts are partially or completely 
excluded from full participation in the proceedings due to limited English 
proficiency or a speech or hearing impairment. It is essential that the resulting 
communication barrier be removed, as far as possible, so that these persons are 
placed in the same position as similarly situated persons for whom there is no 
such barrier.1 As officers of the court, interpreters help ensure that such 
persons may enjoy equal access to justice, and that court proceedings and court 
support services function efficiently and effectively. Interpreters are highly 
skilled professionals who fulfill an essential role in the administration of 
justice. 
Applicability 
This code shall guide and be binding upon all persons, agencies and 
organizations who administer, supervise use, or deliver interpreting services to 
the judiciary. 
Comment. — The black letter principles of trates or elaborates upon the principles. The 
the Model Code on which this Code is based are commentaries are intended to convey what the 
principles of general application that are tin- drafters of this model code believe are probable 
likely to conflict with specific requirements of and expected behaviors. Wherever a court pol-
rule or law in the states, in the opinion of the icy or routine practice appears to conflict with 
code's drafters. Therefore, the use of the term the commentary in this code, it is recommended 
"shall" is reserved for the black letter princi- that the reasons for the policy as it applies to 
pies. Statements in the commentary use the court interpreters be examined, 
term "should" to describe behavior that illus-
Canon 1. Accuracy and completeness. 
Interpreters shall render a complete and accurate interpretation or sight 
translation, without altering, omitting, or adding anything to what is stated or 
written, and without explanation. 
1
 A non-English speaker should be able to understand just as much as an English speaker with 
the same level of education and intelligence would understand. 
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Comment. — The interpreter has a twofold 
duty: (1) to ensure that the proceedings in 
English reflect precisely what was said by a 
non-English speaking person, and (2) to place 
the non-English speaking person on an equal 
footing with those who understand English. 
This creates an obligation to conserve every 
element of information contained in a source 
language communication when it is rendered in 
the target language. 
Therefore, interpreters are obligated to apply 
their best skills and judgment to preserve faith-
fully the meaning of what is said in court, 
including the style or register of speech. Verba-
tim, "word for word" or literal oral interpreta-
tions are not appropriate when they distort the 
meaning of the source language, but every 
spoken statement — even if it appears non-
responsive, obscene, rambling, or incoherent — 
should be interpreted. This includes apparent 
misstatements. 
Comment. — Acceptance of a case by an 
interpreter conveys linguistic competency in 
legal settings. Withdrawing or being asked to 
withdraw from a case after it begins causes a 
disruption of court proceedings and is wasteful 
of scarce public resources. It is, therefore, es-
Comment. — The interpreter serves as an 
officer of the court, and the interpreter's duty in 
a court proceeding is to serve the court and the 
public to which the court is a servant. This is 
true regardless of whether the interpreter is 
publicly retained at government expense or 
retained privately at the expense of one of the 
parties. 
The interpreter should avoid any conduct or 
behavior that presents the appearance of favor-
itism toward any of the parties. Interpreters 
should maintain professional relationships 
with their clients and should not take an active 
part in any of the proceedings. The interpreter 
should discourage a non-English speaking par-
ty's personal dependence. 
During the course of the proceedings inter-
preters should not converse with parties, wit-
nesses, jurors, attorneys, or with friends or 
relatives of any party, except in the discharge of 
their official functions. It is especially impor-
tant that interpreters, who are often familiar 
with attorneys or other members of the court-
room work group, including law enforcement 
officers, refrain from casual and personal con-
versations with anyone in court that may con-
vey an appearance of a special relationship or 
partiality to any of the court participants. 
Interpreters should never interject their own 
words, phrases, or expressions. If the need 
arises to explain an interpreting problem (e.g., 
a term or phrase with no direct equivalent in 
the target language or a misunderstanding 
that only the interpreter can clarify), the inter-
preter should ask the court's permission to 
provide an explanation. Interpreters should 
convey the emotional emphasis of the speaker 
without reenacting or mimicking the speaker's 
emotions, or dramatic gestures. 
The obligation to preserve accuracy includes 
the interpreter's duty to correct any error of 
interpretation discovered by the interpreter 
during the proceeding. Interpreters should 
demonstrate their professionalism by objec-
tively analyzing any challenge to their perfor-
mance. 
sential that interpreters present a complete 
and truthful account of their training, certifica-
tion, and experience prior to appointment so 
the officers of the court can fairly evaluate their 
qualifications for delivering interpreting ser-
vices. 
The interpreter should strive for professional 
detachment. Verbal and non-verbal displays of 
personal attitudes, prejudices, emotions, or 
opinions should be avoided at all times. 
Should an interpreter become aware that a 
proceeding participant views the interpreter as 
having a bias or being biased, the interpreter 
should disclose that knowledge to the appropri-
ate judicial authority and counsel. 
Any condition that interferes with the objec-
tivity of an interpreter constitutes a conflict of 
interest. Before providing services in a matter, 
court interpreters must disclose to all parties 
and presiding officials any prior involvement, 
whether personal or professional, that could be 
reasonably construed as a conflict of interest. 
This disclosure should not include privileged or 
confidential information. 
The following are circumstances that are 
presumed to create actual or apparent conflicts 
of interest for interpreters where interpreters 
should not serve: 
1. The interpreter is a friend, associate, or 
relative of a party or counsel for a party in-
volved in the proceedings; 
2. The interpreter has served in an investi-
gative capacity for any party involved in the 
case; 
Canon 2. Representation of qualifications. 
Interpreters shall accurately and completely represent their certifications, 
training, and pertinent experience. 
Canon 3. Impartiality and avoidance of conflict of interest* 
Interpreters shall be impartial and unbiased and shall refrain from conduct 
that may give an appearance of bias. Interpreters shall disclose any real or 
perceived conflict of interest. 
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3. The interpreter has previously been re-
tained by a law enforcement agency to assist in 
the preparation of the criminal case at issue; 
4. The interpreter or the interpreter's spouse 
or child has a financial interest in the subject 
matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding, or any other interest that would be 
affected by the outcome of the case; 
5. The interpreter has been involved in the 
choice of counsel or law firm for that case. 
Canon 4. Professional demeanor. 
Comment. — Interpreters should know and 
observe the established protocol, rules, and 
procedures for delivering interpreting services. 
When speaking in English, interpreters should 
speak at a rate and volume that enables them 
to be heard and understood throughout the 
courtroom, but the interpreter's presence 
should otherwise be as unobtrusive as possible. 
Interpreters should work without drawing un-
due or inappropriate attention to themselves. 
Canon 5. Confidentiality. 
Comment. — The interpreter must protect 
and uphold the confidentiality of all privileged 
information obtained during the course of her 
or his duties. It is especially important that the 
interpreter understand and uphold the attor-
ney-client privilege which requires confidenti-
ality with respect to any communication be-
tween attorney and client. This rule also 
applies to other types of privileged communica-
tions. 
Interpreters must also refrain from repeating 
or disclosing information obtained by them in 
Comment. — Since interpreters are respon-
sible only for enabling others to communicate, 
they should limit themselves to the activity of 
interpreting or translating only. Interpreters 
should refrain from initiating communications 
while interpreting unless it is necessary for 
Interpreters should disclose to the court and 
other parties when they have previously been 
retained for private employment by one of the 
parties in the case. 
Interpreters should not serve in any matter 
in which payment for their services is contin-
gent upon the outcome of the case. 
An interpreter who is also an attorney should 
not serve in both capacities in the same matter. 
Interpreters should dress in a manner that is 
consistent with the dignity ofthe proceedings of 
the court. 
Interpreters should avoid obstructing the 
view of any of the individuals involved in the 
proceedings. 
Interpreters are encouraged to avoid per-
sonal or professional conduct that could dis-
credit the court 
the course of their employment that may be 
relevant to the legal proceeding. 
In the event that an interpreter becomes 
aware of information that suggests imminent 
harm to someone or relates to a crime being 
committed during the course of the proceed-
ings, the interpreter should immediately dis-
close the information to an appropriate author-
ity within the judiciary who is not involved in 
the proceeding and seek advice in regard to the 
potential conflict in professional responsibility. 
ensuring an accurate and faithful interpreta-
tion. 
Interpreters may be required to initiate com-
munications during a proceeding when they 
find it necessary to seek assistance in perform-
ing their duties. Examples of such drcum-
Interpreters shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the 
dignity of the court and shall be as unobtrusive as possible. 
Interpreters shall protect the confidentiality of all privileged and other 
confidential information. 
Canon 6. Restriction of public comment. 
Interpreters shall not publicly discuss, report, or offer an opinion concerning 
a matter in which they are or have been engaged, even when that information 
is not privileged or required by law to be confidential. 
Canon 7. Scope of practice. 
Interpreters shall limit themselves to interpreting or translating and shall 
not give legal advice, express personal opinions to individuals for whom they 
are interpreting, or engage in any other activities which may be construed to 
constitute a service other than interpreting or translating while serving as an 
interpreter. 
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stances include seeking direction when unable 
to understand or express a word or thought, 
requesting speakers to moderate their rate of 
communication or repeat or rephrase some-
thing, correcting their own interpreting errors, 
or notifying the court of reservations about 
their ability to satisfy an assignment compe-
tently. In such instances they should make it 
clear that they are speaking for themselves. 
An interpreter may convey legal advice from 
an attorney to a person only while that attorney 
is giving it. An interpreter should not explain 
the purpose of forms, services, or otherwise act 
Comment. — If the communication mode or 
language of the non-English-speaking person 
cannot be readily interpreted, the interpreter 
should notify the appropriate judicial author-
ity. 
Interpreters should notify the appropriate 
judicial authority of any environmental or 
physical limitation that impedes or hinders 
their ability to deliver interpreting services 
adequately, e.g., the court room is not quiet 
enough for the interpreter to hear or be heard 
by the non-English speaker, more than one 
person at a time is speaking, or principals or 
witnesses of the court are speaking at a rate of 
speed that is too rapid for the interpreter to 
adequately interpret. Interpreters should no-
tify the presiding officer of the need to take 
periodic breaks to maintain mental and physi-
cal alertness and prevent interpreter fatigue. 
Interpreters should recommend and encourage 
the use of team interpreting whenever neces-
sary. 
Interpreters are encouraged to make inquir-
ies as to the nature of a case whenever possible 
before accepting an assignment. This enables 
interpreters to match more closely their profes-
sional qualifications, skills, and experience to 
potential assignments and more accurately as-
Comment — Because the users of interpret-
ing services frequently misunderstand the 
proper role of the interpreter, they may ask or 
expect the interpreter to perform duties or 
engage in activities that run counter to the 
provisions of this code or other laws, regula-
tions, or policies governing court interpreters. 
It is incumbent upon the interpreter to inform 
as counselors or advisors unless they are inter-
preting for someone who is acting in that offi-
cial capacity. The interpreter may translate 
language on a form for a person who is filling 
out the form, but may not explain the form or 
its purpose for such a person. 
The interpreter should not personally serve 
to perform official acts that are the official 
responsibility of other court officials including, 
but not limited to, court clerks, pretrial release 
investigators or interviewers, or probation 
counselors. 
sess their ability to satisfy those assignments 
competently. 
Even competent and experienced interpret-
ers may encounter cases in which routine pro-
ceedings suddenly involve technical or special-
ized terminology unfamiliar to the interpreter, 
e.g., the unscheduled testimony of an expert 
witness. When such instances occur, interpret-
ers should request a brief recess to familiarize 
themselves with the subject matter. If familiar-
ity with the terminology requires extensive 
time or more intensive research, interpreters 
should inform the presiding officer. 
Interpreters should refrain from accepting a 
case if they feel the language and subject mat-
ter of that case are likely to exceed their skills 
or capacities. Interpreters should feel no com-
punction about notifying the presiding officer if 
they feel unable to perform competently, due to 
lack of familiarity with terminology, prepara-
tion, or difficulty in understanding a witness or 
defendant. 
Interpreters should notify the presiding offi-
cer of any personal bias they may have involv-
ing any aspect of the proceedings. For example, 
an interpreter who has been the victim of a 
sexual assault may wish to be excused from 
interpreting in cases involving similar offenses. 
such persons of his or her professional obliga-
tions. If, having been apprised of these obliga-
tions, the person persists in demanding that 
the interpreter violate them, the interpreter 
should turn to a supervisory interpreter, a 
judge, or another official with jurisdiction over 
interpreter matters to resolve the situation. 
Canon 8. Assessing and reporting impediments to performance. 
Interpreters shall assess at all times their ability to deliver their services. 
When interpreters have any reservation about their ability to satisfy an 
assignment competently, they shall immediately convey that reservation to the 
appropriate judicial authority 
Canon 9. Duty to report ethical violations. 
Interpreters shall report to the proper judicial authority any effort to impede 
their compliance with any law, any provision of this code, or any other official 
policy governing court interpreting and legal translating. 
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Canon 10. Professional development. 
Interpreters shall continually improve their skills and knowledge and 
advance the profession through activities such as professional training and 
education, and interaction with colleagues, and specialists in related fields. 
Comment. — Interpreters must continually that relate to the performance of their profes-
strive to increase their knowledge of the Ian- sional duties. 
guages they work in professionally, including An interpreter should seek to elevate the 
past and current trends in technical, vernacu- standards of the profession through participa-
lar, and regional terminology as well as their tion in workshops, professional meetings, inter-
application within court proceedings. ^^^ ^ t h colleagues, and reading current 
Interpreters should keep informed of all stat- literature in the field, 
utes, rules of courts and policies of the judiciary 
